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Abstract. We consider the problem of implementing distributed protocols, despite adversarial channel
errors, on synchronous-messaging networks with arbitrary topology.
In our first result we show that any n-party T -round protocol on an undirected communication
network G can be compiled into a robust simulation protocol on a sparse (O(n) edges) subnetwork so
that the simulation tolerates an adversarial error rate of Ω
(
1
n
)
; the simulation has a round complexity
of O
(
m log n
n
T
)
, where m is the number of edges in G. (So the simulation is work-preserving up to a
log factor.) The adversary’s error rate is within a constant factor of optimal. Given the error rate, the
round complexity blowup is within a factor of O(k log n) of optimal, where k is the edge connectivity
of G. We also determine that the maximum tolerable error rate on directed communication networks
is Θ(1/s) where s is the number of edges in a minimum equivalent digraph.
Next we investigate adversarial per-edge error rates, where the adversary is given an error budget
on each edge of the network. We determine the limit for tolerable per-edge error rates on an arbi-
trary directed graph to within a factor of 2. However, the construction that approaches this limit has
exponential round complexity, so we give another compiler, which transforms T -round protocols into
O(mT )-round simulations, and prove that for polynomial-query black box compilers, the per-edge error
rate tolerated by this last compiler is within a constant factor of optimal.
1 Introduction
We consider the problem of protecting distributed protocols from channel noise. The two-party case has
received extensive attention, which we briefly survey in Section 1.2. The multiparty case has been studied in
three works. Rajagopalan and Schulman [RS94] showed how to protect synchronous distributed protocols on
digraphs with m edges and n vertices against stochastic noise (at a constant noise rate per bit transmission),
slowing down by a factor of log(max degree). Gelles, Moitra, and Sahai improved on these results [GMS11] by
constructing a computationally efficient simulation with the same properties. The first study of adversarial
noise on multiparty (n > 2) networks is by Jain, Kalai, and Lewko [JKL15]. They focused on a “sequential”
communication model, in which there is at most one message in-flight in the network at any time. Their
networks are undirected (which throughout this work we equate with a symmetric or bidirected digraph),
and they show that if the graph contains one party who is connected to every other (a star subnetwork),
then every “semi-adaptive” T -round protocol can be compiled into an O(T )-round simulation protocol which
tolerates an adversarial bit error rate of Ω( 1n ). They point out that this error rate is within a constant factor
of optimal, because with an error budget of this order, the adversary can effectively cut off one party from the
rest of the graph. They also prove another negative result, showing that in a certain black-box model, even
if the adversary is restricted to a separate budget of errors for each party’s outgoing messages, no constant
error rate can be tolerated.
We return in this paper to the model of synchronous distributed protocols—in each unit of time, each
party transmits one bit to each of its out-neighbors, as in [RS94]—but, unlike [RS94] and [GMS11], we treat
adversarial error. Specifically, the adversary is assumed to know the inputs to all the parties, and the entire
history of communications up to the present. Only the private randomness of the parties is unknown to the
adversary. Our primary objective is to determine (up to a constant) the noise threshold at which reliable
communication becomes possible. On undirected networks, we provide simulation protocols which achieve
this threshold and which are within a factor of O(k logn) of optimal in round complexity (for protocols
achieving the threshold), where k is the edge connectivity of the network.
⋆ Supported by a Nellie Bergen and Adrian Foster Tillotson Summer Undergraduate Research Fellowship from the
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1.1 Outline of our results
The starting point for our main result is a slight variant of the compiler constructed by Rajagopalan and
Schulman [RS94], which we refer to as the RS compiler (see Appendix A for the modifications). Previously
this compiler was analyzed for stochastic errors. We show (Proposition 1) that the RS compiler tolerates an
adversarial error rate of Ω( 1m). On networks with bounded edge connectivity, if we only consider simulation
protocols which run on the same networks as the original protocols, this is within a constant factor of the
best possible error rate: with an error budget of this order, the adversary can effectively disconnect the
network. Thus, to tolerate a higher error rate, we are forced to consider simulations running on subnetworks.
Note that it would not suffice for the parties to simply send dummy messages on those edges which they do
not want to use; rather, our model explicitly allows simulations to run on subnetworks. It may seem strange
that turning off edges can help with noise resiliency but the key is that we are able to redesign the protocol
so that, informally, it “relies on all remaining edges evenly”; consequently, the adversary’s most effective
attacks, which apply the entire error budget to a small region, have an advantage factor of only n rather
than m. In outline, we achieve this as follows, given an arbitrary protocol on an undirected communication
network:
(a) We use multicommodity flow methods to route the messages of the original protocol through a cut
sparsifier.
(b) We modify the sparse network by adding back in some of the edges which were removed, so that the
routes can be short in addition to having low congestion.
(c) We apply the RS compiler to this new protocol on the second sparse subnetwork, so that the final
simulation tolerates an error rate of Ω( 1n ).
This error rate is within a constant factor of optimal, as noted above. Furthermore, the round complexity
blowup is within a factor of O(k logn) of optimal (for protocols tolerant to this error rate), where k is
the edge connectivity of the graph on which the original protocol ran (Theorem 4.) (If one permits shared
randomness, there are cases in which this gap can be narrowed, as we describe in Theorem 5.)
The same basic strategy allows us to determine the optimal error rate on directed graphs. We say that
two digraphs on the same vertex set are reachability-equivalent if they have the same reachability relation.
A minimum equivalent digraph of G is a reachability-equivalent subgraph with the fewest possible edges.
(See [MT69,Hsu75].) We show (Theorem 2) that any protocol on an arbitrary digraph can be simulated to
tolerate an error rate of Ω(1s ), where s is the number of edges in each minimum equivalent digraph. We also
show (Theorem 3) that this error rate is within a constant factor of optimal.
We also investigate a more restricted adversary, who has a separate budget of errors for each edge. We
prove (Theorems 6 and 7) that the cutoff for tolerable per-edge error rates is Θ( 1D ), where D is the maximum
finite directed distance between any two parties in the digraph. However, the positive side of that argument
involves a simulation with exponential round complexity. We prove (Theorem 8) that there is a compiler
which tolerates a per-edge error rate of Ω( 1R ), where R is the maximum number of distinct vertices visited
in any walk through the graph; the simulations output by that compiler have round complexity O(mT ). The
proof of Theorem 8 mostly consists of extending the arguments in [RS94] to establish a tighter analysis of
the RS compiler. By a similar argument to that used in [JKL15], we prove that this per-edge error rate is
within a constant factor of optimal for polynomial-query black-box simulations (Theorem 9).
1.2 Prior work
Classical coding theory methods designed for data transmission cannot be efficiently applied on a per-round
basis to interactive protocols: either the slow-down or the error probability will be large. This problem
was first addressed by Schulman for the case of two-party interactions. [Sch92] treated stochastic (posi-
tive capacity) channels and constructed a randomized compiler that transforms any T -round two-party
protocol into a computationally efficient O(T )-round simulation protocol. Later [Sch93,Sch96] treated ad-
versarial noise and constructed a deterministic compiler that transforms any T -round two-party protocol
into an O(T )-round simulation protocol which tolerates adversarial error at the constant bit error rate
1
240 . This simulation, however, was not computationally efficient against adversarial error; it also relies on
tree codes, which were shown to exist but have not yet been constructed (but see [Bra12,MS14]). Since
then, the original results have been improved in many respects. As mentioned above, [RS94] treated the
multiparty case for stochastic errors; since this solution depended upon tree codes, subsequent work pro-
vided effective simulations for a restricted class of communication protocols [ORS05,ORS09]. Gelles, Moitra
and Sahai [GMS11,GMS14] provided a computationally efficient simulation of multiparty protocols against
stochastic errors which avoids the per-instance pre-sharing of random bits in [Sch92]. Returning to the
two-party problem, Braverman and Rao [BR11] improved the adversarial error rate to 18 . The simulations
in [GMS11,GMS14] work even against adversarial errors for two parties, but they are no longer computa-
tionally efficient in that setting. Brakerski and Kalai [BK12] and Brakerski and Naor [BN13] constructed
computationally efficient simulations at constant adversarial error rates. Several papers focused on noise
thresholds for various channels [GHS14,GH14,EGH15,BE14], while [CPT13] investigated what is possible
while preserving the privacy of information not released by the noiseless protocol. Haeupler [Hae14] showed
how to extend the non-tree-code-based randomized protocol in [Sch92] to cope with adversarial error and at
high rate. Kol and Raz [KR13] showed a strict separation between the communication rates in one-way and
interactive two-party communication.
The paper closest to our work is [JKL15], which initiated the study of adversarial noise in protocols
among n > 2 parties. The main points of comparison are: (a) We provide simulation protocols for general
networks, not only those containing a spanning star subgraph—in this respect our work is more general. (b)
We consider the edges of the network to be capable of carrying simultaneously one bit per edge per unit
time, rather than there being only a single edge of the network on which active communication is occurring
at any time—in this sense the two works are incomparable, the model in [JKL15] favoring communication
complexity and ours favoring round complexity.
1.3 Notation
All of our graphs will be simple (i.e., without loops or multiple edges). For positive results it suffices to show
how to simulate the universal protocol π∗[G, T ], which is a T -round deterministic protocol running on the
digraph G defined as follows. For a party Pi with indegree d
−
i and outdegree d
+
i , a T -round transmission
function for Pi is a function xi, which takes as input d
−
i equal-length sequences of < T bits received and
gives as output d+i bits to transmit. In π
∗[G, T ], each party receives a transmission function as input, does
as it instructs, and gives as output all the bits that she received. We will just write π∗ if G and T are clear.
2 The Noise Threshold for Adversaries with a Global Budget
2.1 Asymptotically optimal error tolerance, and fast simulation, on undirected networks
It was already shown by [JKL15] that reliable communication in an undirected n-vertex network is impossible
against an adversary who can modify O(1/n) of the bit transmissions. (The model in [JKL15] is different
but their argument applies mutatis mutandis to ours.) Our contribution is the converse to this statement:
Theorem 1. There exists a compiler C such that if π is a T -round protocol on a connected, undirected
graph, then C(π) tolerates a bit error rate of Ω( 1n ) and has a round complexity of O
(
m logn
n T
)
.
The RS compiler The main coding-theoretic ingredient in the proof of Theorem 1 is (a slight variant of)
the RS compiler. The RS compiler was designed for stochastic errors, but it turns out to have good properties
in the adversarial setting as well:
Proposition 1. There exists a compiler C (the RS compiler) such that if π is a T -round protocol on a
digraph G, then C(π) tolerates a bit error rate of Ω( 1m ) and has a round complexity of O(T ).
Proposition 1 follows easily from the analysis in [RS94]. We defer proof to Appendix A, where we prove a much
stronger claim about the RS compiler, that is needed for adversaries with per-edge budgets (Theorem 8).
Since the simulations output by the RS compiler tolerate an error rate of Ω(1/m), we can increase error
tolerance to Ω(1/m˜) by first rerouting messages through a subgraph with |E˜| = m˜ edges. (See Equation 10.)
Naturally, we incur some round complexity overhead when we reroute through a sparse subgraph; most of
the effort in this section will go toward minimizing this overhead.
Sparsification For a weighted, undirected graph (G,w), let LG(w) denote its Laplacian matrix. We will
use the following theorem by de Carli Silva, Harvey, and Sato, which builds on [BSS09] (improving in turn
on the earlier [BK96]).
Lemma 1 ([dCSHS11, Corollary 5]). Suppose G = (V,E) is an undirected graph, w : E → R+ is a weight
function, and E = E1 ∪ · · · ∪Ek is a partition of the edge set. For any real ε ∈ (0, 1), there is a deterministic
polynomial-time algorithm to find a subgraph G˜ = (V, E˜) of G and a weight function w˜ : E˜ → R+ such that
xTLG(w)x ≤ xTLG˜(w˜)x ≤ (1 + ε)xTLG(w)x for all x ∈ Rn, (1)∑
e∈Ei
we ≤
∑
e∈E˜∩Ei
w˜e ≤ (1 + ε)
∑
e∈Ei
we for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, (2)
and |E˜| ∈ O (n+kε2 ).
The following is a straightforward consequence of Lemma 1.
Lemma 2. Suppose G = (V,E) is a connected, undirected graph. There exists a subgraph G˜ = (V, E˜) with
|E˜| ∈ O(n) such that for every cut U ⊆ V ,
5m
n
∣∣∣δ˜(U)∣∣∣ ≥ |δ(U)|, (3)
where δ(U) is the set of edges in G crossing U , and δ˜(U) is the set of edges in G˜ crossing U .
Proof. Define w(e) = 1 for every e ∈ E. Partition the edge set E into n sets E = E1 ∪ · · · ∪ En, where each
Ei has at most ⌈mn ⌉ edges in it. Pick ε = 12 , and let G˜ be as in Lemma 1. Consider an arbitrary e ∈ E˜, say
with e ∈ Ei. By Equation 2, ∑
e∈E˜∩Ei
w˜e ≤ 3
2
∑
e∈Ei
we. (4)
Since we = 1 for all e, the right-hand side is just
3
2 |Ei|, which is ≤ 32⌈m/n⌉. Thus, in particular, w˜e ≤ 32⌈m/n⌉.
Now, consider an arbitrary cut U ⊆ V . Let x ∈ Rn be the indicator function for U . By Equation 1,∑
e∈δ(U)
we ≤
∑
e∈δ˜(U)
w˜e. (5)
Since we = 1, the left sum is just |δ(U)|. Since every w˜e ≤ 32⌈m/n⌉, the right sum is ≤ 32 |δ˜(U)| · ⌈m/n⌉. Thus,
|δ(U)| ≤ 3
2
⌈m
n
⌉ ∣∣∣δ˜(U)∣∣∣ ≤ 3
2
(m
n
+ 1
) ∣∣∣δ˜(U)∣∣∣ ≤ 5m
n
∣∣∣δ˜(U)∣∣∣ . (6)
⊓⊔
Routing Suppose N is a multicommodity flow network on G = (V,E); let di denote the demand of
commodity i. We say that the value of a flow F is the largest number λ ∈ [0, 1] such that for every i, λdi
units of commodity i flow from the source of i to the sink of i in F . The maximum concurrent flow of N is
the largest value of any flow. For any cut U ⊆ V , we let Cap(U) denote the sum of the capacities of edges
crossing U , and we let Dem(U) denote the sum of the demands of commodities whose sources and sinks are
on opposite sides of U . We rely on the following approximate max-flow min-cut theorem for multicommodity
flow in undirected networks, due to Linial, London, and Rabinovich.
Lemma 3 ([LLR95, Theorem 4.1]). Let N be a k-commodity undirected flow network on G = (V,E) and
λ its maximum concurrent flow. There is a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm which, given N , finds a
cut U ⊆ V such that
Cap(U)
Dem(U)
≤ O(log k) · λ. (7)
Given just a digraph G, we can naturally define an m-commodity flow network NG on G: the commodity
associated with edge (Pi, Pj) has source Pi, sink Pj , and demand 1; every edge has capacity 1. Combining
Lemma 2 with Lemma 3, we can prove the following lemma.
Lemma 4. Suppose G is an undirected graph. There exists a flow for NG with value Ω
(
n
m logm
)
which uses
only O(n) edges.
Proof. Let G˜ be as in Lemma 2, and let N denote the m-commodity flow network on G˜ with all the same
commodities as NG (and with every edge in G˜ still having capacity 1.) For any cut U , the capacity Cap(U)
is just the number of edges in G˜ which cross U , i.e. |δ˜(U)|; the demand Dem(U) is just the number of edges
in G which cross U , i.e. |δ(U)|. Thus, if we let U be that guaranteed by Lemma 3 for N , we have
n
5m
≤ |δ˜(U)||δ(U)| =
Cap(U)
Dem(U)
≤ O(logm) · λ, (8)
and hence λ ∈ Ω( nm logm ). Of course, the same flow which achieves this λ in N can be used in NG, completing
the proof. ⊓⊔
Flows are allowed to be fractional, but ultimately, we are interested in integer flows (i.e. collections of
paths.) The following lemma quantifies the sense in which fractional flows do not cause too much trouble.
Lemma 5. Suppose G = (V,E) is a digraph, and there is a flow F for NG with value λ which only uses s
edges. Then there exists a set P of m paths through G, containing one path from Pi to Pj for each (Pi, Pj) ∈ E,
which uses at most s distinct edges in total and which has congestion at most 9( 1λ + lnm).
The proof of Lemma 5 is a straightforward probabilistic argument, which we defer to Appendix B.
Lemma 6. Suppose G = (V,E) is a connected, undirected graph. There exists a subgraph G˜ = (V, E˜) with
O(n) edges and a set P of m simple paths through G˜, such that
(i) P contains one path from Pi to Pj for each (Pi, Pj) ∈ E, and
(ii) P has dilation O(m lognn ) and congestion O(m lognn ).
Proof. From Lemmas 4 and 5, there exists a set P0 of m paths, containing one path from Pi to Pj for each
(Pi, Pj) ∈ E, which uses O(n) distinct edges in total and which has congestion O(m logmn ). Let pij denote
the path from Pi to Pj in P0. Define a path p′ij from Pi to Pj by
p′ij =
{
pij if pij has length ≤ m logmn
(Pi, Pj) otherwise.
(9)
Let P = {p′ij : (Pi, Pj) ∈ E}, and let E˜ be the set of edges used by P . Because of the bounds of P0, the sum
of the lengths of the paths in P0 must be O(m logm). Therefore, in particular, the number of paths in P0
of length at least m logmn is O(n). Therefore, P still uses only O(n) distinct edges in total. Furthermore, by
construction, the dilation of P is no more than m logmn . Finally, the congestion on an edge e in P is no more
than the congestion of that edge in P0, plus 1 for the length-1 path across e which may be in P \ P0. Thus,
in particular, the congestion of P is still O
(
m logm
n
)
. Of course, O(logm) = O(log n), so we are done. ⊓⊔
Scheduling We use the following fundamental theorem of Leighton, Maggs and Rao.
Lemma 7 ([LMR94, Theorem 3.4]). Suppose G is a digraph, and P is a set of simple paths through G
with dilation ℓ and congestion c. There exists a schedule for routing packets along the paths in P, with at
most one packet traversing each edge in each time step, in a total of O(c+ ℓ) time steps.
Proof (of Theorem 1). It suffices to describe π˜∗ = C(π∗). The compiler C is formed by composing a “spar-
sifying compiler” with the RS compiler, as depicted in Equation 10.
C : π∗
Sparsifying compiler7−→ π′ RS compiler7−→ π˜∗ (10)
Let G˜ and P be as in Lemma 6; the intermediate protocol π′ runs on G˜. On input x = (x1, . . . , xn), each
round of π∗ is simulated by O
(
m log n
n
)
rounds in π′ as follows. Assume inductively that we have already
simulated τ rounds. Based on these simulations, for each (Pi, Pj) ∈ E, there is some bit bij which xi
instructs Pi to send to Pj during round τ+1 of π
∗. By Lemma 7, there is a schedule by which the parties can
coordinate so that every bij reaches its destination after O
(
m log n
n
)
rounds; the parties follow this schedule.
Thus, π′ successfully simulates π∗ on a noiseless network, and runs in O
(
m logn
n T
)
rounds. Therefore, by
Proposition 1, π˜∗ tolerates an error rate of Ω( 1n ) as a simulation of π
∗, and still runs in O
(
m log n
n T
)
rounds.
⊓⊔
The sparse subgraph can be efficiently constructed, as stated in Lemma 1. There are efficient algorithms
for constructing multicommodity flows that are within a factor of 1+ε of optimal; see e.g. [Mad10]. The proofs
of Lemmas 5 and 6 can be implemented as efficient randomized algorithms in a straightforward way. Efficient
randomized algorithms are also known which construct schedulers with the parameters of Lemma 7 [LMR99].
The RS compiler is not computationally efficient in the presence of adversarial errors.
2.2 The noise threshold in arbitrary digraphs
Positive result (lower bound on tolerable error rates) We can now also easily obtain a lower bound
on the maximum tolerable error rate on arbitrary directed graphs; in this setting, results on undirected
sparsification do not help us to reduce the round complexity of the simulation. What is most interesting here
is identification of the graph parameter that governs the adversarial noise threshold.
Theorem 2. Suppose G = (V,E) is a digraph without isolated vertices, and suppose each minimum equiv-
alent digraph of G has s edges. There exists a compiler C such that if π is a T -round protocol on G, then
C(π) tolerates a bit error rate of Ω(1s ) and has round complexity O(mT ).
Proof. Pick some minimum equivalent digraph G˜ = (V, E˜). Define P to include, for each (Pi, Pj) ∈ E, some
simple path from Pi to Pj through G˜. Clearly, P has dilation no more than n and congestion no more than
m, and there are at most s distinct edges used by P . The same construction as in the proof of Theorem 1
works here. ⊓⊔
We remark that finding a minimum equivalent digraph is NP-hard, but there is a polynomial-time ap-
proximation algorithm with a performance guarantee of about 1.64 [KRY02].
Negative result (upper bound on tolerable error rates) We now show that the error rate of Theorem 2
is within a constant factor of optimal. We begin with the following result by Moyles and Thompson.
Lemma 8 ([MT69, Theorem 1]). Suppose G = (V,E) is a directed acyclic graph, and G˜ = (V, E˜) is a
minimum equivalent digraph of G. Then E˜ is exactly the set of edges (Pi, Pj) ∈ E such that there is no path
from Pi to Pj through G which avoids the edge (Pi, Pj). ⊓⊔
Suppose G = (V,E) is a digraph. We define the relative edge connectivity (REC) of G to be the least k
such that there are k edges whose removal from G changes the reachability relation. For example, if G is
strongly connected, then its REC is simply its edge connectivity.
Lemma 9. Suppose G = (V,E) is a digraph with no isolated vertices, with REC(G) = k. Then it has a
reachability-equivalent subgraph G˜ = (V, E˜) with no more than 5m/k edges.
Proof. Let G1, . . . , Gq be the strongly connected components of G. Let V
∗ = {Gi}i, and let G∗ = (V ∗, E∗)
be the condensation of G. Define a weight function w : E∗ → N by saying that the weight of (Gi, Gj) is
the number of edges in E going from Gi to Gj . By Lemma 8, there is a reachability-equivalent subgraph
G˜∗ = (V ∗, E˜∗) of G∗, such that for each (Gi, Gj) ∈ E˜∗, every path from Gi to Gj through G∗ uses the edge
(Gi, Gj) ∈ E∗. Therefore, each edge (Gi, Gj) ∈ E˜∗ must have weight at least k, since removing the edges
from Gi to Gj in G would make the vertices in Gj unreachable from the vertices in Gi.
We form the subgraph G˜ = (V, E˜) as follows. For each Gi, we define E˜i to be the set of edges in a
minimum equivalent digraph of Gi. We define E˜
D to contain one edge from Gi to Gj for each (Gi, Gj) ∈ E˜∗.
We define E˜ = E˜1 ∪ · · · ∪ E˜q ∪ E˜D. By construction, clearly, G˜ is a reachability-equivalent subgraph of G.
Say each Gi has ni vertices. Then E˜i has no more than 2(ni−1) edges, because we can form a reachability-
equivalent subgraph of Gi with 2(ni − 1) edges by picking a root vertex Pi in Gi and including all edges in
an in-branching of Gi rooted at Pi, as well as all edges in an out-branching of Gi rooted at Pi. Therefore, the
E˜is have, in total, no more than 2n edges. Furthermore, E˜
D has no more than m/k edges, since each edge
in E˜∗ has weight k. Now, n ≤ 2m/k, because k is no more than the minimum number of edges adjacent to
any vertex. Therefore, in total, G˜ has no more than 4m/k +m/k = 5m/k edges. ⊓⊔
Lemma 10. Suppose C is a compiler and G = (V,E) is a digraph. Suppose that for some T > 0, C(π∗[G, T ])
runs on a graph G˜ = (V, E˜) with m˜ = |E˜| edges. Define λ to be REC
(
G˜
)
if G˜ is reachability-equivalent to
G, and λ = 0 otherwise. Then the failure probability of C(π∗[G, T ]) in the presence of the bit error rate λ/m˜
is at least 1− 2−T .
Proof. Say (Pi, Pj) ∈ E and S is a set of λ edges in E˜ such that after removing all the edges in S from G˜,
there is no path from Pi to Pj . Consider the adversary A who zeroes out all messages sent across every edge
e ∈ S. Consider choosing an input x uniformly at random. For any transcript at Pj , the probability of that
transcript conditioned on any input that Pi might receive is equally likely. Thus, Pj has only a 2
−T chance
of correctly guessing the T bits that Pi would have sent Pj if they had followed π
∗[G, T ]. ⊓⊔
Observe that Lemma 10 shows that on undirected networks with bounded edge connectivity, the error
rate Ω( 1m ) is optimal, among simulations which run on that same network.
Theorem 3. Suppose C is a compiler and G is a digraph without isolated vertices, for which each minimum
equivalent digraph has s edges. Then for all T > 0, the failure probability of C(π∗[G, T ]) in the presence of
the bit error rate 5/s is at least 1− 2−T .
Proof. Let G˜ = (V, E˜) be the graph on which C(π∗[G, T ]) runs. Say k˜ = REC
(
G˜
)
, and m˜ =
∣∣∣E˜∣∣∣. If G˜ is
not reachability-equivalent to G, we are done by Lemma 10. Otherwise, s ≤ s˜, where s˜ is the number of
edges in each minimum equivalent digraph of G˜. By Lemma 9, s˜ ≤ 5m˜/k˜. Thus, 5/s ≥ k˜/m˜; an application
of Lemma 10 completes the proof. ⊓⊔
2.3 Lower bound on the round complexity of robust simulations
If G has a small relative edge connectivity, then simulations of protocols on G must run on subgraphs to
achieve optimal error tolerance. Naturally, there is a round complexity cost associated with moving to a
sparse subgraph. These two ideas prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Suppose C is a compiler, ρ ∈ [0, 1], and G is a digraph with REC(G) = k. Suppose the round
complexity of C(π∗[G, T ]) is less than mρk T . Then the failure probability of C(π
∗[G, T ]) in the presence of
the bit error rate ρ is at least 12 .
Proof. Suppose C(π∗[G, T ]) runs on a subgraph G˜ of G, with m˜ edges and with REC
(
G˜
)
= k˜. By Lemma 10,
if ρ ≥ k˜/m˜, we are done, so assume ρ < k˜/m˜. We are also done if G˜ is not reachability-equivalent to G, so
assume that it is, which implies that k˜ ≤ k, and hence m˜ < k/ρ.
Say π˜∗[G, T ] runs in T˜ rounds, with T˜ < Tm/m˜. Observe that the average indegree in G˜ is no more than
m˜/m times the average indegree in G, so there is some party Pi whose indegree d˜
−
i in G˜ is no more than
m˜/m times her indegree d−i in G. Fix some input xi for Pi, and choose every other party’s input uniformly
at random. At the end of the execution of the simulation protocol, Pi must guess d
−
i T bits based on d˜
−
i T˜
bits that she receives. Since d˜−i T˜ < diT , the probability of success is no more than
1
2 . ⊓⊔
When G is connected and undirected, taking ρ ∈ Ω( 1n ) in Theorem 4 shows that the round complexity
blowup of Theorem 1 is within a factor ofO(k logn) of optimal, where k is now just the edge connectivity of G.
On highly connected graphs, this leaves a sizable gap. It is quite possible that there are compilers with optimal
error tolerance and with round complexity lower than that achieved in Theorem 1. The following theorem
establishes that this is at least true if the parties share access to a common random string (unavailable to
the adversary), and if we make a strong assumption on connectivity. (We defer the proof to Appendix C.)
Theorem 5. Suppose G = (V,E) is an undirected graph such that for every (Pi, Pj) ∈ E, the endpoints
Pi and Pj have Ω(n) common neighbors. There exists a shared-randomness compiler C such that if π is a
T -round protocol on G, then C(π) tolerates a bit error rate of Ω( 1n ) with failure probability e
−Ω(T ), and C(π)
has round complexity O(T logn).
3 The Noise Threshold for Adversaries with a Per-Edge Budget
In this section, we are interested in per-edge error rates, where we restrict the distribution of errors as well
as the total number. Specifically, we say that an adversary stays within the per-edge error rate ρ budget if
on each edge, the fraction of bits transmitted on that edge which are flipped is no more than ρ. Note that
when we are considering per-edge error rates, we can assume without loss of generality that simulations run
on the same graphs as the original protocols.
For a digraph G, we define the signal diameter D of G to be the maximum finite distance between any
two vertices in G. That is, the signal diameter of G is the maximum, over all Pi, Pj for which Pj is reachable
from Pi, of the length of the shortest path from Pi to Pj . For example, if G is strongly connected, then the
signal diameter of G is just the ordinary diameter of G.
3.1 Optimal per-edge error rates, ignoring round complexity
Positive result:
Theorem 6. Suppose G is a digraph with signal diameter D. For every ε > 0, there exists a compiler C
such that if π is a protocol on G, then C(π) tolerates the per-edge error rate 14D − ε, and C(π) has round
complexity O(D2nT 2nT ).
Proof. We describe C(π∗[G, T ]). By the Gilbert-Varshamov bound, there is some family of error correcting
codes χ with positive asymptotic rate and minimum relative distance at least 12 −Dε. Let ℓ be sufficiently
long so that for any length-D list F of T -round transmission functions on G, χ(F ) has length no more than
ℓ. Set T˜ = Dℓ. Divide the T˜ rounds into D segments of length ℓ. In the jth segment, Pi transmits (to all of
her out-neighbors) the encoding under χ of the list (xk1 , . . . , xkm) of transmission functions of parties Pks
such that there is a path of length < j from Pks to Pi.
First, suppose some decoding operation failed. Because of the minimum relative distance property, the
adversary must have introduced at least 14ℓ(1−Dε) bit errors on some edge, which is a per-edge error rate
of 14D − 14ε, which exceeds the specified budget. Suppose instead that all decoding operations succeed. Then
every party Pi knows xj for every party Pj from which Pi is reachable. Using this information, Pi can infer
all of the bits that she would have received if the parties had followed π∗ on a noiseless network. Finally,
for the round complexity estimate, note that trivially every party has degree at most n. Hence, to specify a
T -round transmission function, it suffices to specify the nT bits that a party would send, given any arbitrary
length-n list of T -bit incoming strings. Hence, a list of D such transmission functions can be specified with
DnT 2nT bits, so ℓ is O(DnT 2nT ). ⊓⊔
Negative result: We give a matching (up to a factor of 2) negative result, showing that the error rate 12D
cannot be tolerated.
Theorem 7. Suppose C is a compiler and G is a digraph with signal diameter D. Then for all sufficiently
large T , there exists a T -round protocol π such that the failure probability of C(π) in the presence of the
per-edge error rate 12D is at least
1
4 .
Proof. Select vertices P0, . . . , PD such that (P0, . . . , PD) is a shortest path from P0 to PD. Pick any integer
L > 2mD. In the protocol πL, P0 receives an L-bit string x as input, and transmits it to PD along a shortest
path, so that πL runs in T = L+D − 1 rounds. Say C(πL) runs in T˜ rounds.
The strategy of the adversary is to sample two possible inputs x, x′ to P0 in such a way that (a) x 6= x′ with
probability at least 1/2; (b) The probability distribution on the transcripts of all channel communications
leading into PD, is the same whether x or x
′ were given to P0 as input. The theorem will follow.
However, the adversary cannot commit to the pair x, x′ at the very outset so her strategy is slightly more
complicated. Let ℓ be the largest even integer s.t. ℓ ≤ T˜ /D, and let B = T˜ −Dℓ. Note then that B < 2D.
First the adversary selects an input x u.a.r. in {0, 1}L. Then she allows the protocol to proceed without
interference for B rounds. Let χ ∈ {0, 1}mB be the random variable denoting the transcript generated by
all parties in the network during these rounds. The adversary knows the (possibly randomized) simulation
protocol and therefore knows the conditional probabilities of transcripts given inputs. She now samples
x′ ∈ {0, 1}L from the posterior distribution (given χ and the uniform prior on {0, 1}L). For a, b ∈ {0, 1}L
and c ∈ {0, 1}mB, let [a, b, c] denote the event that a was chosen as the input x, c was the transcript χ,
and b was chosen as the “alternate” input x′. The key property of this construction is that for any a, b, c,
Pr([a, b, c]) = Pr([b, a, c]).
Before continuing to describe the adversary’s strategy, let us argue already why (a) holds. Consider
using the following alternate sampling rule for x′: for each χ, instead of selecting x′ from the posteriori
distribution, select x′ to be the max-likelihood decoding of χ. This can only increase Pr(x = x′). This
creates a deterministic decoding map from transcripts χ to inputs, which means that there is a set of at
most 2mB inputs x on which it can ever occur that x = x′. The probability that x is selected from this set
is 2mB−L < 22mD−L ≤ 1/2.
The adversary now breaks the remaining Dℓ rounds of the protocol into D segments, each of ℓ rounds.
Each segment is further broken into two half-segments, each of ℓ/2 rounds. Let d(P, P ′) be the length of a
shortest directed path (possibly infinite) from vertex P to vertex P ′. Let Vk = {P : d(P0, P ) = k}, and let
Wk =
⋃
k′≥k Vk′ . At the beginning of segment k (1 ≤ k ≤ D) she flips a fair coin to decide whether to attack
the first or second half of the segment. During the half-segment that she attacks, she substitutes messages
of her choice for all the messages from Vk−1 to Vk. The manner in which she generates these messages is as
follows.
The adversary’s strategy is to simulate an imaginary, “alternative reality” portion of the network, that
gradually grows. See Figures 1, 2, which for space reasons are in Appendix D. For the duration of the first
segment, the simulated network portion consists of a single vertex P 0, mirroring the actual network vertex
P0. During the second segment the simulated region grows to mirror the induced network on {P0} ∪ V1
(or what is the same, V0 ∪ V1). In general during the kth segment the simulated network region is a copy
of the induced graph on V0 ∪ . . . ∪ Vk. Throughout the entire protocol, the adversary continues simulating
communications on this gradually growing region; during attacking half-segments, the adversary replaces the
Vk−1 → Vk messages by V k−1 → Vk messages, that is, she substitutes the outgoing messages of the simulated
reality on V0 ∪ . . . ∪ Vk for the outgoing messages of the real vertices in that region.
It remains to describe how the states of these imaginary vertices are initialized and updated.
Updates during a segment are as follows: during segment k, the state of each imaginary vertex in V 0 ∪
. . . ∪ V k−1 is updated in each round just as it would in the protocol, using its prior state and, as inputs,
the communications from the other imaginary vertices together with any communications coming from real
vertices in V k.
Initialization at the beginnings of segments are as follows: at time B (the beginning of the first segment),
P 0 is initialized with a random state s chosen from the posteriori distribution conditional on her input being
x′ and on all messages that her genuine counterpart P0 sent and received through time B. For k ≥ 2, at
the beginning of segment k (i.e., at time B + (k − 1)ℓ), we have to enlarge the simulation to include new
vertices V k−1. The existing vertices (those in V 0∪ . . .∪V k−2) continue from their current state. Each vertex
P ∈ V k−1 is initialized with a random state s chosen from the posteriori distribution conditional on all
messages that its genuine counterpart P sent and received up through time B + (k − 1)ℓ.
Notice that the simulation is evolved forward in each round whether or not this is an attacking round.
The imaginary vertices are always responding to messages coming from amongst themselves and from the
real vertices. All that changes is whether Vk is hearing messages from Vk−1 or from V k−1.
The key claim is this. Let s denote the transcript at time B + (k − 1)ℓ of all messages ever received at
vertices in Wk. Then:
Lemma 11. For all s, Pr(s | [x, x′, χ]) = Pr(s | [x′, x, χ]).
That is, to the vertices in Wk, the probability distribution over what they have (collectively) heard up until
this time is the same whether the input is x or x′.
Proof. The proof is by induction on k. The base case is k = 1 and is simply our initial condition that
Pr(χ | x) = Pr(χ | x′). Now for k ≥ 2, let us denote by h = 1 (h = 2) the event that the adversary attacks
during the first (resp. second) half of the (k − 1)’st segment. We claim:
(1) For all s, Pr(s | [x, x′, χ, h = 1]) = Pr(s | [x′, x, χ, h = 2]).
(2) For all s, Pr(s | [x, x′, χ, h = 2]) = Pr(s | [x′, x, χ, h = 1]).
We argue (1) (and (2) follows analogously). At the beginning of the (k−1)’st segment the claim was true
by induction; we need to argue that it remains so at the end of the (k − 1)’st segment, and this could break
down only due to a difference in the statistics on messages from Vk−1 → Vk. This does not occur because for
both events [x, x′, χ, h = 1] and [x′, x, χ, h = 2], what Wk hears during the first half of the (k−1)’st segment,
is messages from vertices “in the x′ world”—more formally, in the event [x, x′, χ, h = 1] it is vertices in V k−1
acting as if the input is x′, while in the event [x′, x, χ, h = 2], it is vertices in Vk−1, with the true input being
x′; while what Wk hears during the second half of the (k− 1)’st segment, is messages from vertices “in the x
world”—more formally, in the event [x, x′, χ, h = 1] it is vertices in Vk−1, with the true input being x, while
in the event [x′, x, χ, h = 2], it is vertices in V k−1 acting as if the input is x.
Finally,
Pr(s | [x, x′, χ]) = 1
2
Pr(s | [x, x′, χ, h = 1]) + 1
2
Pr(s | [x, x′, χ, h = 2])
=
1
2
Pr(s | [x′, x, χ, h = 2]) + 1
2
Pr(s | [x′, x, χ, h = 1])
= Pr(s | [x′, x, χ]).
⊓⊔
⊓⊔
3.2 Optimal per-edge error rates for black-box simulations with polynomial query
complexity
The proof of Theorem 6 does not provide a useful compiler, since the round complexity T˜ blows up expo-
nentially. In this section, we determine (up to a constant) the maximum tolerable per-edge error rate for
polynomial-query compilers in a certain black-box model (described below).
For a digraph G, we define the chain-length R of G to be the maximum, over all directed walks W
through G, of the number of distinct vertices visited in W . Observe that in any graph with at least one edge,
the chain-length is strictly larger than the signal diameter, and that for a strongly connected graph, R = n.
Positive result:
Theorem 8. Suppose G is a digraph with chain-length R. There exists a compiler C such that if π is a
T -round protocol on G, then C(π) tolerates a per-edge error rate of Ω( 1R ) and has round complexity O(mT ).
Most of the effort required to prove Theorem 8 consists of a new analysis of the RS compiler. The key
fact (whose proof we defer to Appendix A) is the following.
Lemma 12. There exists a compiler C (the RS compiler) such that if π is a T -round deterministic protocol
on a digraph G and an execution of C(π) fails, then there is some walk through G on the edges of which were
at least T48 bit errors. The round complexity of C(π) is O(T ).
Proof (of Theorem 8). We let C be as in the proof of Theorem 2, i.e. we reroute messages through a
minimum equivalent digraph before using the RS compiler. Let T ′ ∈ O(m)T denote the round complexity
of the intermediate protocol π′, so that the round complexity of C(π∗) is O(T ′). If C(π∗) fails, then by
Lemma 12, there is some walk W through the minimum equivalent digraph G˜, on the edges of which were
T ′
48 bit errors. Since each strongly connected component H of G˜ with n
′ vertices has no more than 2(n′ − 1)
edges, the number of edges in W is no more than 3R. Thus, on some edge in W , there were T
′
3R·48 bit errors,
which is a per-edge error rate of Ω
(
1
R
)
. ⊓⊔
Black-box negative result: We now give a result which shows that the per-edge error rate in Theorem 8 is
within a constant factor of optimal, among polynomial-query compilers in a certain black-box model. Recall
that in π∗ (or any simulation thereof), each party Pi receives as input a transmission function xi. We will
call a simulation π˜∗ of π∗ a black-box simulation if in π˜∗, the parties only ever access their inputs by making
queries, wherein they specify an input to xi and are given the corresponding output. Naturally, the query
complexity of a black-box simulation is the largest number of total queries that the parties ever collectively
make. A polynomial-query black-box compiler is a compiler C which takes as input a universal protocol
π∗[G, T ] and gives as output a black-box simulation C(π∗[G, T ]), such that for every graph G, there is a
polynomial Q(T ), so that the simulation C(π∗[G, T ]) has a query complexity bounded by Q(T ). Observe
that (for a fixed graph G) the compiler which proved Theorem 8 makes O(T ) queries per round, for a total
query complexity of O(T 2). In contrast, the simulation in the proof of Theorem 6 has exponential query
complexity.
Theorem 9. Suppose C is a polynomial-query black-box compiler. Then for any digraph G with no isolated
vertices and with chain-length R, the failure probability of C(π∗[G, T ]) in the presence of the per-edge error
rate 4R goes to 1 as T →∞.
Both the statement and the proof of Theorem 9 are inspired by the black-box negative result in [JKL15].
The proof is therefore deferred to Appendix E.
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A The RS compiler
A.1 Description of compiler RS0
The compiler described in [RS94] is essentially the compiler that we used and referred to as the RS compiler,
but there are a couple of technicalities that require us to modify the compiler. We begin by briefly describing
a compiler RS0 for deterministic protocols. This compiler RS0 is a slight variant of the compiler described
in [RS94], which we will modify still further in Section A.3 to define the final RS compiler. Fix an arbitrary
digraphG = (V,E) and some deterministic T -round protocol π onG; we will describe RS0(π). Our description
of the simulation is not self-contained, and depends upon [RS94] (specifically the proof of Lemma 5.1.1). In
terms of the description of Σ in [RS94], the only change we are making is to set k = log |S|, a constant,
instead of having k increase with the maximum indegree of G. This effectively eliminates the transmission
code χ.
By [Sch96, Lemma 1], there exists some ternary tree code1 T of infinite depth, distance parameter 12 ,
and alphabet size 287. This tree code will be used to encode strings over the alphabet {0, 1, bkp}, and the
tree code characters, which can be represented by bitstrings of length 9, will be sent over the channels. We
will refer collectively to the 9 rounds needed to send a single tree code character as one step.
In each step, a party Pi begins by tree-decoding all the characters she’s received so far from all of her
in-neighbors, yielding, for each in-neighbor Pj , an estimated unparsed incoming transcript yˆji ∈ {0, 1, bkp}∗.
Each estimate yˆji is parsed into a estimated parsed incoming transcript wˆji ∈ {0, 1}∗ by processing from left
to right, interpreting each bkp symbol as an instruction to delete the previous symbol. Similarly, for each
out-neighbor Pj , Pi recalls the string yij ∈ {0, 1, bkp}∗ that she has transmitted to Pj , and parses this into
a parsed outgoing transcript wij ∈ {0, 1}∗. The parsed transcript at Pi at this moment is the collection of all
these estimated parsed incoming transcripts and parsed outgoing transcripts.
We say that the parsed transcript at Pi is consistent if for every time τ and every out-neighbor Pj of Pi,
the τth bit in the parsed outgoing transcript wij is the bit specified by π to be sent to Pj , given the length-
(τ − 1) prefixes of all the incoming transcripts. If the parsed transcript at Pi is consistent, she transmits
whatever bits are specified by π (encoded using T .) Otherwise, she transmits bkp to all of her out-neighbors.
We run this simulation for T2 steps, where T2 is a parameter which will be chosen later.
A.2 Analysis of RS0(pi)
We recall some terminology from [RS94]. We say that an edge character error occurs on the edge (Pi, Pj)
in step τ + 1 if, in step τ , Pi sends some tree symbol, but Pj receives a different tree symbol. We say that
an edge tree error occurs on (Pi, Pj) in step τ + 1 if, in step τ + 1, Pj ’s estimated, unparsed transcript yˆij
differs from the true unparsed transcript yij . We simply say that a tree error occurs at Pj in step τ + 1 if,
for some in-neighbor Pi, an edge tree error occurs on (Pi, Pj) in step τ + 1. We say that (Pi, τ) and (Pj , τ
′)
are time-like if there is a path from Pi to Pj of length no more than τ
′ − τ . For edges e, e′, we say that (e, τ)
and (e′, τ ′) are time-like if there is some walk which begins with e, ands with e′, and has length no more
than τ ′ − τ + 1. For example, (e, τ) and (e, τ ′) are time-like for any τ ′ ≥ τ ; if e = (Pi, Pj) and e′ = (Pj , Pk),
then (e, τ) and (e′, τ +1) are time-like. Finally, we say that (e, τ) and (Pi, τ ′) are time-like if there is a walk
which begins with e, ends at Pi, and has length no more than τ
′ − τ + 1. For example, if e = (Pi, Pj), then
(e, τ) and (Pj , τ) are time-like. A time-like sequence is a sequence where each pair of successive elements is
a time-like pair. The time history cone of (Pi, τ) is the set of all (Pj , τ
′) such that (Pj , τ ′) and (Pi, τ) are
time-like, unioned with the set of all (e, τ ′) such that (e, τ ′) and (Pi, τ) are time-like.
For a party Pi and a time τ , RP (Pi, τ) is the number of rounds t such that the first t rounds in all of
Pi’s parsed outgoing transcripts (at the end of step τ) match what she would send if all the parties followed
π on a noiseless network. As in [RS94], our goal is to show that if the number of errors is sufficiently small,
then RP (Pi, τ) will be close to τ for every Pi and every τ .
2
Intuition. A key part of the intuition in [RS94] is that if two errors have a space-like separation, then
they should cause no more delay than if only one of them occurred. The analysis in [RS94] establishes a
quantitative version of this idea with regard to tree errors. Specifically, it is shown [RS94, Lemma 5.1.1] that
if RP (Pi, τ) = τ − ℓ, then there is a time-like sequence of at least ℓ/2 tree errors in the time history cone
of Pi at τ . But the intuition still applies if we look at the underlying edge tree errors, instead of just tree
errors.
For example, suppose G is a star graph, with all edges but one directed inward; say there are q edges
pointing inward. Consider the adversarial strategy of dividing the rounds of the simulation into q equal
segments, and spending the ith segment zeroing out the bits sent across the ith inward-facing edge. As tree
errors (rather than edge tree errors), this is a time-like sequence of errors, simply because they all have the
same recipient. Thus, the analysis in [RS94] does not show that the simulation will succeed in the face of
this adversary. However, if we pay attention to the underlying edge tree errors, we see that these errors do
not have a time-like separation; signals sent along one incoming edge can never affect signals sent along
1 See [Sch96] for the definition of a tree code.
2 Observe that this will not immediately mean that the simulation is successful, since the criterion for success is that
the parties give the correct outputs, which depends on their estimated incoming transcripts, not their outgoing
transcripts. We deal with this small technicality in Section A.3.
another incoming edge. This suggests that for sufficiently large q, the simulation will succeed (for all round
complexities T ), since the longest sequence of time-like edge tree errors is only of length about T/q.
And indeed, this suggestion is easily seen to be true. After the central party recovers from the edge tree
errors on the first couple of incoming edges, she is sufficiently far behind the other incoming parties in the
simulation that further edge errors do not affect her; by the time a symbol actually affects the central party’s
transmissions, it has been “cleaned up” by the tree code mechanism, so she makes no further mistakes.
For a party Pi and a time τ0, we define Y (Pi, τ0) to be the maximum length of any time-like sequence
of edge character errors in the time history cone of Pi at τ0. (Compare Y (Pi, τ) to the quantity X(Pi, τ)
analyzed in [RS94].) As in [RS94], we let B(Pi, τ) denote the number of times that Pi has transmitted bkp up
to step τ , and we let AT (Pi, τ) = τ − 2B(Pi, τ), so that AT (Pi, τ) is the length of every outgoing transcript
of Pi’s at time τ . Most of our effort will go toward proving the following proposition, analogous to [RS94,
Proposition 5.2.1].
Proposition 2. For any party Pi and any time τ ,
τ ≤ RP (Pi, τ) + 24Y (Pi, τ) +B(Pi, τ). (11)
Toward proving Proposition 2, we make the following definitions.
Definition 1. For an edge (Pi, Pj) ∈ E and an alleged (parsed) transcript zij ∈ {0, 1}∗, we define the
accuracy of zij to be the length of the longest prefix of zij which is a prefix of the sequence of bits that Pi
would send Pj on a noiseless network.
Definition 2. The action of Pj in step τ + 1 is defined as follows.
3
– Suppose RP (Pj , τ + 1) > RP (Pj , τ). Then the action of Pj in step τ + 1 is progress.
– Suppose RP (Pj , τ + 1) = RP (Pj , τ), and Pj backs up in step τ + 1. Then the action of Pj in step τ + 1
is justified backup.
– Suppose RP (Pj , τ + 1) < RP (Pj , τ), or RP (Pj , τ + 1) = RP (Pj , τ) and Pj transmits data in step
τ + 1. Say that an in-neighbor Pi of Pj is accuracy minimizing if the accuracy of the estimated, parsed
transcript wˆij is minimized at Pi among in-neighbors of Pj .
• If, for every accuracy minimizing Pi, the accuracy of the true transcript wij is strictly more than the
accuracy of the estimated transcript wˆij , we say that the action of Pj in step τ +1 is harmful tree
error.
• Otherwise, we say that the action of Pj in step τ + 1 is harmful propagated error.
Lemmas 13, 14, and 15 are fairly technical, and are motivated only by the fact that they will be useful
for proving Proposition 2.
Lemma 13. Suppose that in step τ0 + 1, the action of Pj is either harmful tree error or harmful
propagated error. Let Pi be accuracy minimizing, and say that the accuracy of wˆij is k−1. Then if Pj trans-
mitted data in step τ0+1, then RP (Pj , τ0) ≥ k, while if Pj backed up in step τ0+1, then RP (Pj , τ0) ≥ k+1.
Proof. First, suppose Pj transmitted data in step τ0 +1. Then Pj did not “regret” any of her transmissions,
i.e. her parsed transcript was consistent. Thus, the length-k prefixes of her outgoing parsed transcripts
must be correct, since they match the accurate length-(k − 1) prefixes of her estimated incoming parsed
transcripts. Next, suppose Pj backed up in step τ0 + 1. From the action, we must have RP (Pj , τ0) =
AT (Pj , τ0). Furthermore, since Pj “regrets” a transmission which is, in fact, correct, we must have k ≤
AT (Pj , τ0)− 1. Therefore, RP (Pj , τ0) ≥ k + 1 as claimed. ⊓⊔
Recall that the magnitude of an edge tree error on (Pi, Pj) is the length of the suffix of the affected
estimated unparsed transcript yˆij which begins with the first symbol which differs from the corresponding
symbol of the true unparsed transcript yij .
Lemma 14. Suppose Equation 11 holds for every party Pi and every τ ≤ τ0. Suppose that in step τ0 + 1,
there is an edge tree error of magnitude M > 0 on (Pi, Pj). Suppose that RP (Pi, τ0) ≤ RP (Pj , τ0) + 2M ,
and B(Pi, τ0) ≤ B(Pj , τ0) +M . Then Equation 11 holds for Pj and τ = τ0 + 1.
3 This notion is analogous to, but not the same as, the function Action in [RS94].
Proof. Since RP and B change at most one each round, we have
RP (Pi, τ0 + 1−M) ≤ RP (Pi, τ0) +M − 1 (12)
≤ RP (Pj , τ0) + 3M − 1 (13)
≤ RP (Pj , τ0 + 1) + 3M, (14)
and similarly
B(Pi, τ0 + 1−M) ≤ B(Pj , τ0 + 1) + 2M. (15)
From the tree code condition, we can be sure that in the M steps preceding and including step τ0 + 1, the
character error rate on (Pi, Pj) was at least
1
4 . Therefore, we have
Y (Pi, τ0 + 1−M) ≤ Y (Pj , τ0 + 1)− 1
4
M. (16)
Applying Equation 11 to Pi at τ = τ0 + 1−M and using Equations 14, 15, and 16, we have
τ0 + 1−M ≤ RP (Pi, τ0 + 1−M) + 24Y (Pi, τ0 + 1−M) +B(Pi, τ0 + 1−M) (17)
≤ RP (Pj , τ0 + 1) + 3M + 24Y (Pj , τ0 + 1)− 6M +B(Pj , τ0 + 1) + 2M (18)
= RP (Pj , τ0 + 1) + 24Y (Pj , τ0 + 1) +B(Pj , τ0 + 1)−M, (19)
which completes the proof. ⊓⊔
The following lemma is proven in exactly the same way as an analogous statement in [RS94].
Lemma 15. Suppose Equation 11 holds for all Pi and all τ ≤ τ0. Suppose that RP (Pj , τ0) = AT (Pj , τ0),
and for some in-neighbor Pi, B(Pi, τ0) > B(Pj , τ0). Then Equation 11 holds for Pj and τ = τ0 + 1.
Proof. By hypothesis, RP (Pj , τ0) = τ0− 2B(Pj , τ0). We also have RP (Pi, τ0) ≤ τ0− 2B(Pi, τ0). Subtracting
gives RP (Pj , τ0) + 2B(Pj , τ0) ≥ RP (Pi, τ0) + 2B(Pi, τ0). Using our assumption B(Pi, τ0) ≥ B(Pj , τ0) + 1,
this implies
RP (Pj , τ0) +B(Pj , τ0) ≥ RP (Pi, τ0) +B(Pi, τ0) + 1. (20)
Now, observe that RP (Pj , τ0 + 1) + B(Pj , τ0 + 1) ≥ RP (Pj , τ0) + B(Pj , τ0), because the B term can only
increase in step τ0 + 1, while the RP term can only decrease by at most 1 and in that case the B term
increased. Therefore, we have
RP (Pi, τ0) +B(Pi, τ0) < RP (Pj , τ0 + 1) +B(Pj , τ0 + 1). (21)
Of course, Y (Pi, τ0) ≤ Y (Pj , τ0+1), so an application of Equation 11 at Pi at τ = τ0 completes the proof. ⊓⊔
Proof (of Proposition 2). We proceed by induction on τ . At τ = 0, all terms of Equation 11 are zero. For the
inductive step, assume that Equation 11 holds for all τ < τ0; we will prove that it holds for τ = τ0 + 1. Fix
some party Pi. If the action of Pi in step τ + 1 is progress, then RP (Pi, τ0 + 1) = RP (Pi, τ0) + 1, and the
B and Y terms do not decrease from τ0 to τ0 +1, so we are done. Similarly, if the action of Pi is justified
backup, then B(Pi, τ0 + 1) = B(Pi, τ0) + 1, and the RP and Y terms do not decrease. The final two cases,
harmful tree error and harmful propagated error, are treated in Lemmas 16 and 17 below.
Lemma 16. Suppose Equation 11 holds for all Pi and all τ ≤ τ0. Suppose that in step τ0 + 1, the action of
Pj is harmful tree error. Then Equation 11 holds for Pj and τ = τ0 + 1.
Proof. Let Pi be an accuracy minimizing in-neighbor of Pj , and say that the accuracy of wˆij is k− 1. As the
name of the action indicates, because the kth symbol of the true transcript wij is correct and present while
the kth symbol of the estimated transcript wˆij is not, there must have been an edge tree error on (Pi, Pj).
Say that the tree error was of magnitude M . Then wij and wˆij agree in their first (|wij | − 2M) positions. In
particular, |wij | ≤ k + 2M − 1 < k + 2M .
By Lemma 13, RP (Pj , τ0) ≥ k. Therefore, |wij | ≤ RP (Pj , τ0) + 2M . Of course, |wij | = AT (Pi, τ0) ≥
RP (Pi, τ0), so
RP (Pi, τ0) ≤ RP (Pj , τ0) + 2M. (22)
Again because wij and wˆij agree in their first (|wij | − 2M) positions, |wij | ≥ |wˆij | − 2M .
First, suppose that Pj transmitted data in step τ0 + 1. Then |wˆij | ≥ AT (Pj , τ0), so AT (Pi, τ0) ≥
AT (Pj , τ0)− 2M , which implies that
B(Pi, τ0) ≤ B(Pj , τ0) +M. (23)
An application of Lemma 14 completes the proof in this case. Next, suppose that Pj backed up in step τ0+1.
If B(Pi, τ0) ≤ B(Pj , τ0), then once again, Lemma 14 completes the proof. But if B(Pi, τ0) > B(Pj , τ0), then
Lemma 15 completes the proof, since the action implies that AT (Pj, τ0) = RP (Pj , τ0). ⊓⊔
Lemma 17. Suppose Equation 11 holds for every party Pi and every τ ≤ τ0. Suppose that in step τ0 + 1,
the action of Pj is harmful propagated error. Then Equation 11 holds for Pj and τ = τ0 + 1.
Proof. Let Pi be an accuracy minimizing in-neighbor such that the accuracy of wij is no more than the
accuracy of wˆij , and say that the accuracy of wˆij is k − 1. Then RP (Pi, τ0) < k. We claim that
RP (Pi, τ0) ≤ RP (Pj , τ0 + 1)− 1. (24)
To see why, first suppose Pj transmitted data in step τ0 + 1; then RP (Pj , τ0 + 1) = RP (Pj , τ0), and by
Lemma 13, RP (Pj , τ0) ≥ k, which completes the proof of Equation 24. Next, suppose Pj backed up in step
τ0 +1; then RP (Pj , τ0 +1) = RP (Pj , τ0)− 1, and by Lemma 13, RP (Pj , τ0) ≥ k+1, so RP (Pj , τ0 +1) ≥ k,
again completing the proof of Equation 24.
Now, for a first case, suppose B(Pi, τ0) ≤ B(Pj , τ0 +1). Then applying Equation 11 to Pi at τ = τ0 gives
τ0 ≤ RP (Pi, τ0) + 24Y (Pi, τ0) +B(Pi, τ0) (25)
≤ RP (Pj , τ0 + 1)− 1 + 24Y (Pj , τ0 + 1) +B(Pj , τ0 + 1), (26)
completing the proof. For the second case, suppose B(Pi, τ0) = B(Pj , τ0 + 1) + ℓ, with ℓ > 0.
– For the first subcase, suppose that Pj transmitted data in step τ0 + 1; then B(Pi, τ0) = B(Pj , τ0) + ℓ,
so there was an edge tree error of magnitude M ≥ ℓ on edge (Pi, Pj) in step τ0 + 1. Therefore, we can
apply Lemma 14 to complete the proof, since RP (Pi, τ0) ≤ RP (Pj , τ0 + 1)− 1.
– Finally, for the second subcase, suppose that Pj backed up in step τ0 +1. Then RP (Pj , τ0) = AT (Pj , τ0)
and B(Pi, τ0) > B(Pj , τ0 + 1) > B(Pj , τ0), so we can apply Lemma 15.
This completes the proofs of Lemma 17 and Proposition 2. ⊓⊔
⊓⊔
The following lemma follows easily from Proposition 2; it is analogous to [RS94, Lemma 5.1.1].
Lemma 18. Suppose RP (Pi, τ) = τ − ℓ. Then there is some time-like sequence of ℓ48 edge character errors
in the time history cone of Pi at τ .
Proof. Doubling Equation 11 and rearranging gives
RP (Pi, τ)− τ + 48Y (Pi, τ) ≥ τ −RP (Pi, τ)− 2B(Pi, τ) = AT (Pi, τ)−RP (Pi, τ).
The right-hand side is nonnegative, so Y (Pi, τ) ≥ ℓ48 . ⊓⊔
A.3 The final RS compiler
All the work we have done to analyze RS0 has focused on RP as a measure of progress, but RP is not directly
related to our success criterion, which is that the parties give the correct outputs at the end of the simulation,
or equivalently that the parties are able to correctly guess the bits they would have received if the parties
had followed the original protocol on a noiseless network. To address this technicality, before applying RS0,
we will modify the protocol so that any bits that the parties receive are immediately retransmitted over
dummy channels to dummy parties. The resulting compiler is the RS compiler, which we denote RS.
We describe RS(π) for arbitrary deterministic protocols π. Let V = V ∪ {Pn+i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n} be two
disjoint copies of V , where Pn+i is a copy of Pi. Let E = E ∪ {(Pi, Pn+j) : (Pj , Pi) ∈ E}. Let G = (V ,E).
From the T -round protocol π on G, we define a (T + 1)-round protocol π on G as follows. The inputs for π
are exactly the same as the inputs for π. When Pi ∈ V receives an input xi, she uses the “ordinary” edges in
G to do what π instructs her. (In the extra round at the end, she just sends a zero on every ordinary edge.)
On each “dummy” edge (Pi, Pn+j), in round τ , she transmits the bit that she received in round τ − 1 on the
corresponding ordinary edge (Pj , Pi). (In the first round, she just sends a zero on every dummy edge.)
The protocol RS(π), which runs on the original graph G, is essentially RS0(π), with T2 = 2T + 1.
Technically, RS0(π) runs on G; naturally, the parties in RS(π) do not literally send bits across the dummy
edges, but they keep track of which bits they would have sent across the dummy edges, and on the ordinary
edges, they behave exactly as in RS0(π). At the end of the simulation, Pi gives as output whatever π
instructs her to give as output, under the assumption that her parsed outgoing transcripts accurately reflect
the (incoming and outgoing) transcripts that would have occurred if the parties had followed π on a noiseless
network.
We can now prove Lemma 12 and Proposition 1.
Proof (of Lemma 12). The round complexity of RS(π∗[G, T ]) is 9T2 ≤ 27T . If the execution fails, then there
must be some party Pi such that RP (Pi, 2T +1) < T +1. Therefore, by Lemma 18, there was some time-like
sequence of T48 edge character errors. Each character error is associated with at least one bit error. ⊓⊔
Proof (of Proposition 1). By Lemma 12, if RS(π∗) fails, there were at least T48 bit errors, which is a bit error
rate of at least ρ = T/4827Tm =
1
1296m . ⊓⊔
B Proof of Lemma 5
Without loss of generality, assume that precisely λ units of each commodity flow in F . For each (Pi, Pj),
randomly form a path pij from Pi to Pj as follows. Initially, pij is just Pi; in each step, extend pij by randomly
selecting an outgoing edge, with the probability of selecting an edge being proportional to the amount of
flow of commodity (Pi, Pj) which goes across that edge. Repeat until the path reaches Pj . Let P be the set
of paths pij formed in this way.
Fix some edge e ∈ E. For each (Pi, Pj) ∈ E, the probability that e ∈ pij is equal to the flow of commodity
(Pi, Pj) across e in F divided by λ, and these are independent events. Therefore, the expected value of the
congestion ce of e is exactly equal to fe/λ, where fe is the total flow across e in F , and by the Chernoff
bound, for any ε > 0,
Pr
(
ce ≥ (1 + ε)fe
λ
)
≤ exp
(
− ε
2
2 + ε
fe
λ
)
≤ exp
(
− ε
2
(2 + ε)2
· (1 + ε)fe
λ
)
. (27)
If we define ε so that (1 + ε) feλ = 9(
1
λ + lnm), then certainly ε > 1 simply because fe ≤ 1, and hence
ε2
(2+ε)2 >
1
9 . Therefore,
Pr
(
ce ≥ 9
(
1
λ
+ lnm
))
< exp
(
−1
9
· 9
(
1
λ
+ lnm
))
=
1
m
e−1/λ. (28)
Taking a union bound over all m edges e, we see that with positive probability, the total congestion of P is
no more than 9( 1λ + lnm). ⊓⊔
C Proof of Theorem 5
The compiler C used to prove Theorem 5 is formed by composing the RS compiler with a magi coding4
compiler, as in Equation 29. Note that the RS compiler comes first in this composition, in contrast to the
compilers used to prove Theorems 1 and 2.
C : π∗
RS compiler7−→ π′ Magi coding compiler7−→ π˜∗ (29)
We will need the following fact about the RS compiler, which is stronger than Proposition 1.
4 To avoid King Herod, the biblical Magi went home along a different route than they had planned. (Matthew 2:12)
Proposition 3. There exists η > 0 such that if an execution of RS(π∗) fails, then in that execution, the
fraction of rounds in which bit errors occurred was at least η.
Proof. This is established already by the proof of Lemma 12, since time-like character errors must occur in
distinct steps. ⊓⊔
The idea of the magi coding compiler is straightforward: parties send bits to randomly chosen third
parties, who deliver them to their recipients.
C.1 Description of magi coding
Since π′ is deterministic, immediately upon receiving her input, every party Pi can compute the transmission
function x′i which describes her behavior in π
′. Magi coding works by simulating each round of π′ individually;
the simulation of a single round is given by Algorithm 1. That is, at the beginning of an execution of
Algorithm 1, for each edge (Pi, Pj), Pi has in mind a bit bij that she would like to send to Pj ; at the end
of the execution, Pj has a guess bˆij about the value of bij . If we have inductively simulated τ rounds of π
′
in this way, then in round τ + 1, each bit bij is determined by x
′
i under the assumption that the previous
estimates {bˆj′i} were all correct.
Say that every adjacent pair of vertices have at least εn common neighbors. Algorithm 1 makes reference
to a number ℓ. We define
ℓ =
24
ε
log
(
2m
α
)
, (30)
where α is a parameter to be chosen later. For our purposes, it will suffice to take α = 14η, where η is that
given in Proposition 3.
1 repeat ℓ times:
2 Using shared randomness, pick a random number 1 ≤ r ≤ n, as well as two random bits wij , w
′
ij for each
edge (Pi, Pj) ∈ E.
3 for each edge (Pi, Pk) ∈ E, all simultaneously:
4 Define j so that i+ j + k ≡ r (mod n).
5 Pi sends bit bij ⊕ wij to Pk, who receives yij = bij ⊕ wij ⊕ noise.
6 for each edge (Pk, Pj) ∈ E, all simultaneously:
7 Define i so that i+ j + k ≡ r (mod n).
8 Pk sends bit yij ⊕ w
′
ij to Pk, who receives zij = bij ⊕ wij ⊕ noise⊕ w
′
ij ⊕ more noise.
9 Pj casts a vote for zij ⊕ wij ⊕ w
′
ij , in an election for the office of bˆij with candidates {0, 1}.
10 By majority vote, for each (Pi, Pj) ∈ E, Pj decides on an estimate bˆij .
Algorithm 1: A single segment of magi coding.
We refer to the 2ℓ rounds of communication needed to execute Algorithm 1 as one segment. The simulation
runs for T ′ segments, where T ′ is the round complexity of π′.
C.2 Analysis of magi coding
We say that a simulated bit error occurs in segment t if, at the end of segment t, for some edge (Pi, Pi),
bij 6= bˆij .
Lemma 19. Fix a segment. Suppose that in that segment, the adversary introduces at most 132εnℓ bit errors.
Then the probability of a simulated bit error in that segment is no more than α.
Proof. Fix (Pi, Pj) ∈ E. In each iteration of the loop, the probability that r is chosen such that i + j + r
(mod n) is the index of a common neighbor of Pi and Pj is at least ε. Thus, the expected number of votes
that Pj casts regarding bˆij is εℓ. These are independent events, so by the Chernoff bound, the probability
that fewer than 12εℓ such votes are cast is no more than exp(− 18εℓ) ≤ α2m .
Say the number of bit errors that the adversary introduces during the τth iteration of the main loop of
Algorithm 1 is aτ , for 1 ≤ τ ≤ ℓ. Fix some iteration τ of that loop. For any edge e, the probability that bij
is sent across e during that iteration is no more than 2n , because of the choice of r. Furthermore, in both
rounds in that iteration, it remains true conditioned on all bits that have been transmitted (i.e. on all the
information that the adversary has) that the probability that bij is sent across e in that round is no more
than 2n . (This was the purpose of the random bits wij , w
′
ij .) Therefore, by the union bound, the probability
that the adversary corrupts bij in this iteration is at most
4aτ
n .
The expected number of iterations in which the adversary corrupts bij is no more than
1
8εℓ. These events
are independent, so by the Chernoff bound, the probability that more than 14εℓ incorrect votes are cast is
no more than exp(− 124εℓ) = α2m .
If, at the end of the segment, bˆij 6= bij , then either Pj cast fewer than 12εℓ votes regarding bˆij , or else Pj
cast at least 14εℓ incorrect votes regarding bˆij . Therefore, by the union bound, Pr(bˆij 6= bij) ≤ αm . Taking
another union bound over the m edges (Pi, Pj) completes the proof. ⊓⊔
Observe that magi coding does not simply make it difficult for the adversary to create a high simulated
bit error rate. Indeed, if she wants to introduce a simulated bit error rate of ρ, she can simply choose a ρ
fraction of the segments and corrupt every single edge in the even-numbered rounds of the chosen segments,
costing her an actual bit error rate of ρ/2. Rather, the gain from magi coding is that it makes it difficult for
the adversary to introduce a positive number of simulated bit errors in a large number of segments:
Lemma 20. Suppose that during the execution of π˜∗, the adversary introduces at most 116αεℓnT
′ bit er-
rors. Then the probability that at least one simulated bit error occurs in each of 4αT ′ different segments is
e−Ω((1−2α)T
′).
Proof. Say that a segment is targeted if the adversary introduces at least 132εℓn bit errors in that segment.
By hypothesis, at most 2αT ′ segments are targeted. On the other hand, from Lemma 19, we know that in
each non-targeted segment, the probability that at least one simulated bit error occurs is at most α. There
are T ′ segments total, so the expected number of non-targeted segments in which at least one simulated bit
error occurs is at most αT ′. There are at least (1 − 2α)T ′ non-targeted segments, and these events are all
independent. Therefore, by the Chernoff bound, the probability that at least one simulated bit error occurs
in 2αT ′ different non-targeted segments is e−Ω((1−2α)T
′). ⊓⊔
Proof (of Theorem 5). Note that π˜∗ runs in 2ℓT ′ rounds, which is O(T logn) rounds as claimed. If π˜∗ fails,
then by Proposition 3, there were at least ηT ′ distinct segments in which a simulated bit error occurred. By
Lemma 20 with α = 14η, as long as the adversary is restricted to introducing at most
1
16αεℓnT
′ bit errors,
then the probability of simulated bit errors occurring in ηT ′ distinct segments is e−Ω(T ). This tolerable
amount of error corresponds to the bit error rate ρ given by
ρ =
1
16
1
4ηεℓnT
′
mT˜
=
ηεn
128m
≥ ηε
128n
. (31)
⊓⊔
D Illustration of the proof of Theorem 7
V0 V1 V2
V 0 V 1 V 2
V3 V4 V5
Fig. 1. The adversarial strategy used to prove Theorem 7 on a graph with D = 5, during segment 3. Regions with
solid black boundaries represent sets of actual parties, with double boundaries indicating sets of parties who do not
know whether x or x′ is the true input. Regions with dashed red boundaries represent sets of imaginary parties.
Solid black arrows indicate channels controlled by actual parties; dashed red arrows indicate channels controlled by
imaginary parties.
V0 V1 V2 V3
V 0 V 1 V 2 V 3
V4 V5
Fig. 2. Segment 4 of the situation depicted in Figure 1.
E Proof of Theorem 9
Description of the adversary’s strategy Fix some digraph G with no isolated vertices and with chain-
length R. We begin with the following lemma.
Lemma 21. There is a walk through G of length < n2 which visits R distinct vertices, with each vertex
visited at most R times.
Proof. Let v1, . . . , vR be the R distinct vertices visited in some chain-length walk through G, in the order in
which they are visited. There is a path from vi to vi+1 of length no more than n for each 1 ≤ i < R which
visits each vertex at most once. Chaining these paths together yields a walk with the desired properties. ⊓⊔
Fix some positive integer T . Say T˜ is the round complexity of the black-box simulation π˜∗ = C(π∗[G, T ]).
Let (Pk1 , Pk2 , . . . , Pkℓ) be the sequence of parties visited (with repetition) in the walk guaranteed by Lemma 21,
so that (Pki , Pki+1) ∈ E for all i and ℓ ≤ n2. Let fi denote the number of times that Pki is visited in this
walk, so that 1 ≤ fi ≤ R. The adversary’s strategy is given by Algorithm 2.
1 if T˜ ≥ R2:
2 Divide the T˜ rounds into ℓ segments, with the ith segment containing no more than
⌈
T˜
Rfi
⌉
rounds.
3 for i = 1 to ℓ:
4 Spend the ith segment zeroing out all messages going into or out of Pki .
5 else:
6 Do nothing.
Algorithm 2: The strategy of the adversary A used to prove Theorem 9.
Note that the step on line 2 is well defined, because
ℓ∑
i=1
⌈
T˜
Rfi
⌉
≥ T˜
R
ℓ∑
i=1
1
fi
= T˜ , (32)
where the last equation holds because each of R distinct parties contributes a total of 1 to the sum.
Analysis of the adversary’s strategy
Lemma 22. The adversary A described by Algorithm 2 introduces a per-edge error rate of no more than
4/R.
Proof. In the case T˜ < R2, the statement is trivial, so assume T˜ ≥ R2. The number of rounds in which A
attacks an edge of the form (Pki , Pkj ) is no more than
fi
⌈
T˜
Rfi
⌉
+ fj
⌈
T˜
Rfj
⌉
≤ fi + T˜
R
+ fj +
T˜
R
≤ 2R+ 2T˜
R
≤ 4T˜
R
. (33)
For an edge e with an endpoint which is not a Pki , A attacks e in even fewer rounds than this. ⊓⊔
Suppose Pi is a party with indegree d
−
i and outdegree d
+
i . Observe that we can identify a T -round
transmission function xi for Pi with a (2
d−
i )-ary tree of depth T whose vertices are labeled with strings in
{0, 1}d+i . The edges in a path from the root to a vertex v in this tree specify a sequence of bits received from
each in-neighbor, and the label of v specifies the bits to send in the scenario described by that path. In these
terms, when a party Pi in a black-box simulation π˜
∗ makes a query, she effectively specifies a node in xi and
asks what its label is. For an input x = (x1, . . . , xn), we can identify in each xi the “true path” t
x
i from the
root to a leaf of xi, consisting of all the edges that would be taken if the parties followed π
∗ in a noiseless
network. In these terms, the goal of the protocol is for each Pi to learn t
x
i .
Lemma 23. Suppose T˜ < R2. Then if we pick an input x uniformly at random, the probability that π˜∗ fails
in the presence of A on x is at least 1− 2d−1 (R2−T ), where d−1 is the indegree of P1.
Proof. Consider fixing an arbitrary transmission function x1 and choosing the rest of x uniformly at random.
Then P1 needs to choose between (2
d−
1 )T possible true paths (each of which is a priori equally likely), based
on < (2d
−
1 )R
2
bits. Thus, the probability of success is no more than 2d
−
1
(R2−T ). ⊓⊔
Definition 3. In the case that T˜ ≥ R2, for 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, say that Ei is the event that at the end of segment
(i−1), the following condition holds. Let u denote the node at depth (i−1)
⌈√
T
⌉
along txki . Then the subtree
hanging from u is completely unexplored, i.e. Pki has not made any queries about the labels of any vertices
in that subtree.
Lemma 24. Suppose T˜ ≥ R2 and C(π∗) and has query complexity no more than 2
√
T (1−δ), where 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1.
Suppose we pick an input x uniformly at random, and execute π˜∗ on x in the presence of A. Then for each
1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, conditioned on E1, . . . , Ei−1, the probability that Ei occurs is at least δ.
Proof. For the analysis, it suffices to fix arbitrary values for any random bits that π˜∗ uses (still choosing x
randomly.) Vacuously, E1 occurs with probability 1, so assume i > 1. Consider an arbitrary input x such
that E1, . . . , Ei−1 occur. Let w be the node at depth (i− 2)
⌈√
T
⌉
in txki−1 , and let τ be the subtree hanging
from w. Since Ei−1 occurred, at the beginning of segment (i−1), Pki−1 had not explored any of τ . Therefore,
if x′ is the same as x except for the labels of the nodes in τ , then the execution of π˜∗(x′) prior to segment
(i−1) is the same as that of π˜∗(x). Let U denote the set of locations of labels of nodes in τ which correspond
to bits transmitted from Pki−1 to Pki . Consider altering x by assigning values to the bits in U uniformly at
random.
Starting at depth (i − 2)
⌈√
T
⌉
in txki , at each level, the true path could go one of two ways, depending
on the value of a bit in U which is at the same level in xki . Thus, the node at depth i
⌈√
T
⌉
in txki could
be any of 2⌈
√
T⌉ different nodes, each with equal probability. Say this set of 2⌈
√
T⌉ nodes is S. At the end
of segment (i − 1), Pki has made fewer than 2
√
T (1 − δ) queries total, and thus the fraction of nodes in S
whose subtrees she has not explored at all is at least δ. The queries she chooses to make during segment
(i − 1) cannot depend on the labels assigned to nodes in U , because Pki−1 is attacked by A during segment
(i−1). Therefore, when we assign values to U uniformly at random, the probability that Ei occurs is at least
δ. Therefore, if we choose x uniformly at random, then conditioned on E1, . . . , Ei−1, the probability that Ei
occurs is at least δ. ⊓⊔
Lemma 25. Suppose Q(T ) is a polynomial. Then for all sufficiently large T ,
Q(T ) < 2
√
T
(
1− 2−1/T
)
. (34)
Proof. Note that 12e
1/2 < 1. Therefore, from the limit definition of the exponential function, we see that for
sufficiently large T , (
1− 1/2
T
)T
>
1
2
e1/2 · e−1/2 = 1
2
. (35)
Taking a T th root of both sides gives 1− 1T > 2−1/T , and therefore
2
√
T
(
1− 2−1/T
)
>
2
√
T
T
. (36)
Obviously, for sufficiently large T , the right-hand side is larger than Q(T ). ⊓⊔
Proof (of Theorem 9). Say that the simulations output by C make a number of queries which is bounded by
the polynomial Q(T ). Since we only care about the limit as T →∞, we may assume that T > 16n4, and by
Lemma 25, we may also assume that
Q(T ) < 2
√
T
(
1− 2−1/T
)
. (37)
We will show that if we pick an input x for π∗[G, T ] uniformly at random, the failure probability δ of π˜∗ in
the presence of A satisfies
δ ≥ min{2−(n2/T ) · (1− 2− 12T ), (1 − 2d−1 (R2−T ))} (38)
which in particular means that δ → 1 as T → ∞. (Recall that G is fixed.) If T˜ < R2, then we are done by
Lemma 23. Assume, therefore, that T˜ ≥ R2.
The probability that Ei happens for all 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ is
∏ℓ
j=1 Pr(Ei|E1, . . . , Ei−1), which by Lemma 24 is at
least 2−ℓ/T . Since ℓ ≤ n2, the probability that Ej happens for all 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ is at least 2−n2/T . Suppose Eℓ−1
happens. Then at the end of segment (ℓ− 2), Pkℓ−1 has not made any queries about the labels of any of the
vertices in the subtree τ hanging from the node at depth (ℓ−2)
⌈√
T
⌉
along txkℓ−1 . The height h of τ satisfies
h = T − (ℓ− 2)
⌈√
T
⌉
≥ T − n2
⌈√
T
⌉
≥ T − 2n2
√
T . (39)
Since T > 16n4, we have 12
√
T > 2n2, and hence h ≥ 12T .
During segment ℓ, all messages going into Pkℓ are zeroed out, so the output of Pkℓ at the end of the
protocol does not depend on queries that Pkℓ−1 makes during segment ℓ. After fixing the labels of all nodes
other than those in τ , each step in txkℓ at the level of τ could go one of two ways, based on a label of a node in
τ . Therefore, conditioned in Eℓ−1, the probability that Pkℓ correctly guesses t
x
kℓ
is no more than 2−
1
2
T , since
τ has height at least 12T . Thus, conditioned on Eℓ−1, the probability that Pkℓ′+1 fails to guess her transcript
is at least (1 − 2− 12T ). Multiplying, we see that (unconditionally) the probability that Pj fails to guess her
transcript is at least 2−n
2/T (1− 2− 12T ), and thus Equation 38 is satisfied. ⊓⊔
